Is there such a thing as an arbitration joke? Here is a test. Two plaintiffs walk into a court, claiming that each was wrongfully terminated by a bank (UBS). The bank moves to compel arbitration by plaintiff one; and it moves to dismiss the judicial claim of plaintiff two because that plaintiff had already brought his claim in an arbitration that he commenced. The Court finds that both plaintiffs are bound by arbitration agreements with UBS and that their claims are within the scope of the arbitration clauses. The punchline: “the court denies UBS’s motion to dismiss [plaintiff two’s] claims and to compel arbitration of [plaintiff one’s] claims.” See Zoller v. UBS Secs. LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44170 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2018) (emphasis added).

Continue Reading Whiplash: When a Court Finds That the Parties’ Claims Are Within the Scope of a Valid Arbitration Agreement, But It Will Not Compel Arbitration

An ex parte proceeding in a U.S. court to “recognize,” “enforce,” or “confirm” an arbitration award against a foreign sovereign is improper. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a lengthy and instructive decision to that effect in Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 863 F.3d 96 (2d. Cir. 2017). Its lesson is that in the United States, the only way to enforce (or recognize or confirm) an arbitral award issued against a sovereign entity by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) (and probably otherwise as well) is in compliance with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).

Continue Reading When Seeking to Enforce an ICSID Arbitration Award Against a Foreign Sovereign, Think FSIA First

As discussed in an earlier post, obtaining discovery from a non-party to an arbitration often is easier said than done. Depending on the law of the place of arbitration, arbitrators may not be able to compel document production or testimony from a non-party before a hearing on the merits. This can impair a claimant’s ability to prove its claims considerably, or in some cases altogether inhibit a potential claimant from learning the facts necessary to identify the correct respondent(s) or to articulate a competent claim. Moreover, while Fed. R. Civ. P. 27 permits pre-action discovery to “perpetuate testimony regarding [a] matter that may be cognizable,” many federal courts have interpreted the phrase “perpetuate testimony” to mean that Rule 27 may only be used to “preserve testimony which could otherwise be lost,” rather than as a “substitute for discovery.” Ash v. Cort, 512 F.2d 909, 912 (3d Cir. 1975); accord Bryant v. Am. Fedn. of Musicians of the United States, 666 Fed. Appx. 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2016); In re Allegretti, 229 F.R.D. 93, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[Rule 27] is not a method of discovery to determine whether a cause of action exists; and, if so, against whom the action should be instituted.”)).

Continue Reading Pre-Arbitration Discovery: Turn to State Law Where the Federal Rules are Inadequate

Arbitration is a creature of contract. So is the law concerning contracts with an arbitration clause the same as the law concerning any other contract? Almost. One must always bear in mind the “separability” or “independence” of the arbitration agreement — the autonomy principle.

Continue Reading Arbitrability Basics: An Illustration of the “Autonomy” Principle

The drive in the Second Circuit to clarify the rules regarding confirmation and enforcement of various types of arbitration awards continues. The latest addition is the decision in BSH Hausgerate GmbH v. Kamhi, 17 Civ. 5776, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34597 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 2, 2018) (Sweet, J.). Federal district courts have occasionally decided that an arbitration award is ambiguous or incomplete or indefinite, and therefore should be remanded to the arbitrator for clarification rather than confirmed by the court. Judge Sweet seeks to bring clarity to the law concerning the judicial treatment of international arbitral awards in particular, holding that “ambiguity” is not a cognizable basis for refusing to enforce (or “confirm”) such an award.

Continue Reading “Ambiguity” Is Not a Basis to Deny a Petition to Enforce a Foreign Arbitration Award

Arbitration is often promoted as faster, cheaper, more predictable, and more controllable than litigation. But to many, arbitration’s promise comes up short on delivery. Why? A prime reason is that many parties do not make use of their ability to shape a proceeding that fulfills those promises, and end up with an arbitration that is more time consuming, more expensive, and less predictable than it could have been.

Continue Reading Dissecting Common Basic Arbitration Clauses — You Can Build a Better One

The courts undoubtedly have the power to grant provisional remedies in aid of a pending arbitration – including temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and attachments. As a recent Fifth Circuit decision reminds us, the courts also can grant such remedies in aid of an arbitration that has yet to be commenced. Indeed, those remedies may be available under state law, even if the future arbitration is governed by the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “Convention”), and even if the arbitration will be sited in a state other than the one in which the interim remedy is sought.

Continue Reading Your Arbitration Is Not Yet Filed, But Attachment in Aid of That Arbitration May Be Available

Published in Law 360 (February 15, 2018)

In a series of articles over the past several months, we asked whether “class arbitration” — meaning the utilization of the Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 class action protocol in an arbitration proceeding — is ultimately viable in U.S. jurisprudence. We suggested that it arguably is not, considering the fundamental nature of arbitration. And we noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had not addressed core issues that will ultimately determine the viability of a class arbitration award, nor had the various Courts of Appeal grappled with those issues. But the courts in the Second Circuit have begun to do so.

Continue Reading Is “Class Arbitration” an Oxymoron — Another Shoe Drops in the Second Circuit

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, “[t]he district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to . . . produce a document for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal . . . .” Courts in the Second Circuit appear to be coming around to accepting that a commercial arbitration can be “a foreign or international tribunal” for these purposes. Swell. But there is one more thing: they are also likely to treat a subpoena under that statute like a subpoena under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, and therefore require that the court have personal jurisdiction — general, preferably — over the subpoena target. See, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. v. APR Energy Holding Ltd., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142404 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2017) (“ANZ Bank”).

Continue Reading Oh, And One More Thing . . . Issuing A Subpoena For Documents Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Also Requires Personal Jurisdiction Over The Subpoena Target

Typically, the issue of whether a party is bound by an arbitration agreement is raised in a judicial motion to compel under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 4). The issue also may be raised in a judicial application to stay an arbitration, as to which the Section 4 procedure applies as well. Occasionally, however, the issue is decided by an arbitrator in the first instance. When the matter eventually reaches a court — e.g., in the context of a post-arbitration motion to confirm or to vacate an award (FAA §§ 9, 10) — and the arbitrator’s decision regarding party arbitrability is to be reviewed, that facet of the judicial proceeding is likely to resemble one for an application under FAA § 4. That is, the judicial review will be de novo, the Section 4 procedure will likely be adopted, and the court will not be restricted to the record before the arbitrator — additional evidence will be permitted.

Continue Reading A Belated Judicial Determination Regarding Whether a Party Is Bound By An Arbitration Agreement Requires a “De Novo” Proceeding