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Gilbert Samberg is a Member in the firm’s New York office. He has advised and represented a wide variety of international clients in avoiding, prosecuting, and resolving financial, commercial, and technology-related disputes by means of arbitration, mediation, negotiation and litigation.  Gil also has acted as a mediator and as an arbitrator in international disputes.

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq., provides the usual means of enforcing an arbitration agreement by compelling a party to arbitrate rather than litigate. Thus, the FAA enables an aggrieved party to seek “an order directing that such arbitration proceed in a manner provided for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4.

Continue Reading When Seeking to Compel Arbitration, a Motion to Dismiss Is Sometimes the First Step

Is there such a thing as an arbitration joke? Here is a test. Two plaintiffs walk into a court, claiming that each was wrongfully terminated by a bank (UBS). The bank moves to compel arbitration by plaintiff one; and it moves to dismiss the judicial claim of plaintiff two because that plaintiff had already brought his claim in an arbitration that he commenced. The Court finds that both plaintiffs are bound by arbitration agreements with UBS and that their claims are within the scope of the arbitration clauses. The punchline: “the court denies UBS’s motion to dismiss [plaintiff two’s] claims and to compel arbitration of [plaintiff one’s] claims.” See Zoller v. UBS Secs. LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44170 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2018) (emphasis added).

Continue Reading Whiplash: When a Court Finds That the Parties’ Claims Are Within the Scope of a Valid Arbitration Agreement, But It Will Not Compel Arbitration

The drive in the Second Circuit to clarify the rules regarding confirmation and enforcement of various types of arbitration awards continues. The latest addition is the decision in BSH Hausgerate GmbH v. Kamhi, 17 Civ. 5776, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34597 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 2, 2018) (Sweet, J.). Federal district courts have occasionally decided that an arbitration award is ambiguous or incomplete or indefinite, and therefore should be remanded to the arbitrator for clarification rather than confirmed by the court. Judge Sweet seeks to bring clarity to the law concerning the judicial treatment of international arbitral awards in particular, holding that “ambiguity” is not a cognizable basis for refusing to enforce (or “confirm”) such an award.

Continue Reading “Ambiguity” Is Not a Basis to Deny a Petition to Enforce a Foreign Arbitration Award

Published in Law 360 (February 15, 2018)

In a series of articles over the past several months, we asked whether “class arbitration” — meaning the utilization of the Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 class action protocol in an arbitration proceeding — is ultimately viable in U.S. jurisprudence. We suggested that it arguably is not, considering the fundamental nature of arbitration. And we noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had not addressed core issues that will ultimately determine the viability of a class arbitration award, nor had the various Courts of Appeal grappled with those issues. But the courts in the Second Circuit have begun to do so.

Continue Reading Is “Class Arbitration” an Oxymoron — Another Shoe Drops in the Second Circuit

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, “[t]he district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to . . . produce a document for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal . . . .” Courts in the Second Circuit appear to be coming around to accepting that a commercial arbitration can be “a foreign or international tribunal” for these purposes. Swell. But there is one more thing: they are also likely to treat a subpoena under that statute like a subpoena under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, and therefore require that the court have personal jurisdiction — general, preferably — over the subpoena target. See, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. v. APR Energy Holding Ltd., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142404 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2017) (“ANZ Bank”).

Continue Reading Oh, And One More Thing . . . Issuing A Subpoena For Documents Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Also Requires Personal Jurisdiction Over The Subpoena Target

Typically, the issue of whether a party is bound by an arbitration agreement is raised in a judicial motion to compel under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 4). The issue also may be raised in a judicial application to stay an arbitration, as to which the Section 4 procedure applies as well. Occasionally, however, the issue is decided by an arbitrator in the first instance. When the matter eventually reaches a court — e.g., in the context of a post-arbitration motion to confirm or to vacate an award (FAA §§ 9, 10) — and the arbitrator’s decision regarding party arbitrability is to be reviewed, that facet of the judicial proceeding is likely to resemble one for an application under FAA § 4. That is, the judicial review will be de novo, the Section 4 procedure will likely be adopted, and the court will not be restricted to the record before the arbitrator — additional evidence will be permitted.

Continue Reading A Belated Judicial Determination Regarding Whether a Party Is Bound By An Arbitration Agreement Requires a “De Novo” Proceeding

Arbitration is of course a creature of contract, and so a party may not be compelled to arbitrate unless it has agreed, or is deemed to have agreed, to arbitrate a dispute. An offeree may be deemed to have manifested its agreement to an arbitration regime by various sorts of conduct, including in some instances inaction in the face of notice. However, there is a line in the sand in that regard in the Sixth Circuit when it comes to employer-employee relations. That is, an employer’s notice of its institution of a mandatory arbitration policy or program is, without more, insufficient to compel an employee to arbitrate a subsequent dispute. Something more is required in order to be able to infer the employee’s knowing assent to the new term of employment.

Continue Reading An Employer’s Notice to Employees of a Mandatory Arbitration Program May be Insufficient Basis to Compel Arbitration

When is “silence” in an arbitration clause concerning class arbitration not “Stolt-Nielsen silence”? And what is the difference between a “claim” and a “procedure”? The Ninth Circuit seemingly took hair-splitting to a new level in conceiving the former question, and apparently suffered some uncertainty regarding the latter, when it issued its memorandum decision in Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. 16-56085 (Aug. 3, 2017).

Continue Reading Class Arbitration: Contractual “Crickets” Are Sufficient for Ninth Circuit to Determine That Class Arbitration Is Permitted, Distinguishing Stolt-Nielsen

Published in Law 360 (July 28, 2017)

In a recent series of articles, we asked whether “class arbitration” — meaning the utilization of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class action protocol in an arbitration proceeding — is ultimately viable. Given the nature of arbitration, we suggested that it arguably is not. We noted that the United States Supreme Court and various Courts of Appeal had examined several related procedural questions, but that they had not gotten to the core issues that would ultimately determine the viability of a class arbitration award.

Continue Reading Is “Class Arbitration” an Oxymoron — a Shoe Drops in the Second Circuit

Do you ever have days when you are not your most eloquent self, the words come out in a jumble, or they are just not precisely what you intended? So do trial judges.  But appeals courts seem to understand.

Thus, in Davis v. Fenton, Nos. 16-2121, 16-2165 (7th Cir. May 26, 2017), the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals decided, among other things, that when a suit is “administratively dismissed without prejudice” by a District Court “subject to full reinstatement upon the completion of [a] required arbitration,” that just means that it was “stayed pending arbitration.”  Consequently, an appellant got no traction with an argument that he had correctly commenced a proceeding in state court to challenge the eventual arbitral award, and the federal District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it subsequently confirmed the award in question.  Wait, did that come out right?

Continue Reading Keeping the Lights On For Your Ancillary Proceeding in Federal Court: When “Dismissed Without Prejudice” Means “Stayed”